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Two weeks after Brazil's President Fernando Henrique Cardoso let the local currency, the real, float,
concerns are growing about the country's ability to recover its financial health. The real shows no
signs that it has hit bottom, inflation is once again a concern, and political turmoil has not subsided.
Cardoso is under pressure to outline a clear economic and political direction in the wake of the
collapse of the currency whose stability had become the symbol of his government.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) officials arrived in Brasilia Jan. 26 to discuss the future of the US
$41.5 billion credit line put together to prevent a collapse of Brazil's economy. The real's devaluation
has raised fears that Brazil might default on its debt. While the IMF was instrumental in arranging
the bailout, critics also say it was part of the problem. One critic, financier George Soros, writing in
a recent issue of Newsweek, said IMF policies exacerbated the situation in Brazil and increased the
recession. As of Jan. 29, the real had depreciated more than 44%.
Capital flight largely to blame for forcing the devaluation has continued, with an average of US$300
million a day reportedly leaving the country. Since September, foreign reserves have fallen from US
$75 billion to less than US$30 billion. During Cardoso's first term, inflation plummeted from 2,700%
a year in 1993 to just 2% last year. But less than a month into Cardoso's second term, inflation has
re-entered the vocabulary. General Motors (GM) announced a 12.8% price hike and Ford Motor Co.
said it would impose an 11% increase. Fiat and Volkswagen soon followed, blaming the weak real
and cost of imported parts for the price hikes.
After widespread criticism, GM lowered its price increase to 5.5%. A hotel in the capital of Brasilia
raised rates by 30%, and some computer stores in Sao Paulo illegally marked prices in dollars or
indexed them to the exchange rate. "Whoever wants to take advantage of this moment will be
punished," Communications Minister Pimenta da Veiga warned last week, attacking GM and Ford.
"First by public opinion, and then by the government." Unruly governors at bottom of crisis
The crisis was touched off Jan. 6 when former president and newly inaugurated governor of Minas
Gerais Itamar Franco announced a 90-day moratorium on repayment of his state's estimated US
$13.5 billion debt to the federal government (see NotiSur, 01/15/99). Six other opposition-party
governors joined Franco in Belo Horizonte, his state capital, for a strategy session. They condemned
the belt-tightening policies of the federal government as "cruel and unjust," and called on Cardoso
to open talks with them by Feb. 5 to renegotiate their debt.
When Cardoso took office in 1995, the total internal debt owed by federal, state, and municipal
governments was equal to 29% of Brazil's GDP. By Cardoso's second inauguration on Jan. 1, that had
risen to 41% of GDP, nearly one-third of which is owed by states. The debt soared because states
and cities largely financed their deficits by borrowing from federal banks, and they were able to
roll over most loans on favorable terms. But as interest rates skyrocketed to nearly 50% in recent
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months, those debts reached unmanageable levels. "It's an arm-wrestling match, and in the end, the
federal government is going to have to surrender and negotiate less onerous terms for the states on
their debts," said Alexandre Barros, a political consultant.
The federal government has begun withholding Minas Gerais' portion of federal revenue-sharing
funds and can retain the state's share of money raised from sales taxes. But Franco has raised the
stakes by threatening to default on a payment of US$108 million in Eurobonds due early in February
unless the federal government unfreezes the funds it is holding back. Not meeting that obligation
would devastate Brazil's international image and credit rating, and the federal government has been
forced to announce that it will pay the bill for Minas Gerais.
Nevertheless, the federal government said it will no longer guarantee any loans for Minas Gerais
or Rio Grande do Sul with international institutions, which will make it almost impossible for them
to obtain new external credits and could lead to cancellation of loans already in the pipeline. Key
legislation finally passes The rebellion by the states had one positive effect, however. It helped the
central government pressure Congress to pass some of the reform legislation.
"The federal government should be extremely thankful to Itamar," columnist Marcio Moreira Alves
said in the Rio de Janeiro newspaper O Globo. He said Franco's confrontation forced Congress
to take action. Brazil's Senate passed a key austerity measure Jan. 26, which will reduce pension
payments to 300,000 federal retirees. The measure was key to convincing international investors that
Brazil was serious about financial reform. The bill now goes to Cardoso, who is expected to sign it.
The changes will raise the pension contributions of most government workers to just under 25% of
their wages for the highest earners and will require pensioners to pay tax on their pensions. The
bill will only save US$2.5 billion this year, but the plan ignores longstanding opposition by retired
government workers to continue to pay into the pension system. Former finance minister and
congressional Deputy Antonio Delfim Netto said that he didn't agree with the measure but voted
for it "to stop the dollar going through the roof." Opposition party deputies took a different view.
"We're taking money from the elderly just to show foreign investors we're working on the crisis,"
said Paulo Paim of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Rio Grande do Sul.

Crisis could bring more Cabinet changes
The first casualty of the crisis was former Central Bank president Gustavo Franco, who quit rather
than oversee a devaluation he opposed, and rumors persist that Finance Minister Pedro Malan
may be on his way out. "His situation is very delicate. He's under a lot of pressure," said political
consultant Carlos Lopes in Brasilia. "The impression is that the government has lost its way." But a
presidential spokesman denied that Malan will leave. "This does not justify changes at the Finance
Ministry," said Sergio Amaral.
Nevertheless, speculation is growing that the government will formulate new economic
policies that rely less on volatile foreign capital, and the press has begun to discuss a new era of
"developmentalism," an undefined combination of more aggressive foreign trade policies and
lower interest rates to favor local industry over speculative foreign investors. Malan aides deny a
rift between the minister and pro- development proponents in the government. "This supposed
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dichotomy between pure monetarists and developmentalists does not exist," said an official close to
the minister. "Brazil's situation has changed and our policies will too. Our policies have to suit the
moment."
Meanwhile, Cardoso is calling for a "national debate" on how to reactivate the economy. Although
Cardoso is unlikely to do anything radically new in the short term, he has summoned business and
union leaders to think through a program of economic development. "We're going to try to do what
is in the interests of society," Communications Minister Joao Pimenta da Veiga told reporters. "The
discussion is going to be on what kind of development we want for Brazil, where and how to do it
with these resources."

No sign of clear policies
On Jan. 27, Uruguayan President Julio Maria Sanguinetti told his Cabinet that the Brazilian crisis
stemmed from Cardoso's drive for re-election. To get re-elected, Cardoso "did not do what he
should have done, and later found himself forced to do what he should have done earlier," said
Sanguinetti at a Cabinet meeting called to discuss ways to minimize the effects of Brazil's crisis on
Uruguay. "These are the problems of re-election," said Sanguinetti, who is serving his second, but
not consecutive, term as president.
By Jan. 28, analysts were saying that Cardoso, apparently at a loss as to how to end the country's
worst crisis since he introduced the real in 1994, was losing the confidence of both foreign investors
and his electorate. "The credibility of the government at this point is in the worst way possible," said
Marcelo Mesquita of local bank Warbug Dillon Read. "This lack of a coordinated policy is creating a
lot of fear."
The staggering interest rates, raised repeatedly to slow the exit of capital and now at 37% for the
benchmark rate, have all but stopped industry and put Brazilians out of work in record numbers.
Unemployment in December reached 7.6%, the highest in 15 years. November's industrial
employment data showed a 9.5% drop in blue-collar jobs from November 1997. Luiz Inacio Lula
da Silva, head of the PT, called Cardoso's "passivity" in the face of the crisis terrifying. "He does
not discuss anything, only capital flight," said Lula. "Few times in my 53 years have I seen Brazil
as adrift as it is now, and I have the impression that the country has no government." [Sources:
Clarin (Argentina), 01/21/99; Inter Press Service, 01/22/99; The New York Times, 01/22/99, 01/24/99,
01/25/99; Associated Press, 01/25/99, 01/26/99; Spanish news service EFE, 01/27/99; Notimex,
01/28/99; Reuters, 01/21/99, 01/25-29/99]
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